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Abstract
We study regional migration dynamics in a general framework and provide
a foundation for the commonly used two-stage equilibrium. We also examine
the robustness of bifurcations when parameters change along arbitrary smooth
(C1) paths. We show that bifurcations with crossing equilibrium loci are rare,
which include, for example, the popular pitchfork bifurcation.
Keywords: Bifurcation; Genericity analysis; Migration dynamics; Two-stage
equilibrium
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1 Introduction
Economic activities are not distributed uniformly in space. Nonagricultural produc-
tion often concentrates in a few regions, resulting in a core-periphery pattern. Why
do producers agglomerate? There are various reasons, for example, the economies
of localization and urbanization, natural advantages, the provision of public goods,
and imperfect competition. In this paper, we investigate the migration dynamics of
￿rms and workers among regions. Particularly, we study the dynamics concerning the
following question: ￿How does one region come to dominate the others and become
a core of manufacturing?￿
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1Initiated by Abdel-Rahman (1988), Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990), and Krug-
man (1991a, 1993a, b), the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model has become the standard tool
in the new economic geography. In this model, ￿rms that produce di⁄erentiated prod-
ucts with increasing returns to scale technologies compete monopolistically. There
are two types of pecuniary externalities that generate the forces sustaining production
agglomeration. They result in the positive feedback that comes from ￿rms locating
near each other. First, manufacturing production will concentrate where there is
a large market with many workers consuming manufactured goods. Second, work-
ers will move to where the production concentrates because the manufactured goods
are cheaper there. Employing this model of manufacturing production, Krugman
(1991), and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) explain the emergence of the core-
periphery pattern with the dynamics of a ￿pitchfork bifurcation￿ :1 They consider an
economy consisting of two regions with equal resources. There are equal populations
of immobile farmers in both regions who produce a homogeneous agricultural good,
and also a population of mobile manufacturing workers that migrate between regions.
Workers move to the region where they have a higher utility level. The transporta-
tion of manufactured goods across regions bears a cost while that of the agricultural
good does not. With other parameters ￿xed, when the transportation cost is high,
the symmetric equilibrium, where both regions have the same manufacturing pop-
ulations, is the only equilibrium and it is stable. When the transportation cost is
moderate, two other stable equilibria emerge; when this happens, one of the two re-
gions attracts all the manufacturing production. When the transportation cost is low,
the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and the only stable equilibria are the
two core-periphery equilibria. Note that the core-periphery equilibria are boundary
equilibria where one of the regions has no workers.
Regional divergence can occur when the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable.
However, the pitchfork bifurcation does not depict a robust picture of the dynamics
involved. A recent paper by Anas and Li (2002) illustrates this point. They study a
more general model and examine changes in other parameters as well. They show that
depending on the values of the ￿xed parameters, the equilibrium diagram displays
di⁄erent patterns (not only the pitchfork bifurcation). In some cases, there are no
bifurcations at all. The following example illustrates that the pitchfork bifurcation
disappears under a small perturbation of parameter values. Consider the following
1It is also called the ￿tomahawk bifurcation￿with modi￿cations of the boundary equilibria.
2Figure 1: a = 5; ￿2 < b < 2; c = 0:
dynamical system:
_ x = a(x ￿ 0:5)
3 ￿ b(x ￿ 0:5) (1)
where x;a;b 2 <. When a is held ￿xed, except at a = 0, every equilibrium diagram
obtained by varying b contains a pitchfork bifurcation (Figure 1 shows the case of
a = 5).2 Consider the following system (c 2 <):
_ x = a(x ￿ 0:5)
3 ￿ b(x ￿ 0:5) + c: (2)
It includes (1) as a special case at c = 0. However, if we perturb c slightly, the resulting
equilibrium diagram does not contain a pitchfork bifurcation, even though the general
contour is preserved (see Figures 2 and 3 for c = 0:001; ￿0:001 respectively). After
adding a parameter c, the pitchfork bifurcation almost never occurs. Moreover, if we
￿x a and vary b in the original system (1), there is no pitchfork bifurcation either
(see Figure 4). This raises the following question: ￿what kind of dynamic behavior is
typical given enough parameters?￿
In spite of the illustrative cases presented in previous work, there are method-
ological issues to be resolved concerning the study of dynamics: (i) The choice of
parameters under investigation a⁄ects the dynamic behavior of a system. It is possi-
ble that when we study other parameters, which may not be present in the current
2All ￿gures are computation results. The solid and dashed lines indicate stable and unstable
equilibria respectively.
3Figure 2: a = 5; ￿2 < b < 2; c = 0:001:
Figure 3: a = 5; ￿2 < b < 2; c = ￿0:001:
4Figure 4: ￿2 < a < 2; b = 0:05; c = 0:
models, the economy displays other types of bifurcations (such as the saddle-node
or transcritical bifurcations which can be generated by a one-dimensional system).
(ii) It is interesting to study the e⁄ects of one parameter at a time, especially if the
parameter is a dominant force changing the economy (say, transportation cost). Yet,
parameters do not change one at a time in the real world. A more plausible case is that
all parameters change simultaneously resulting in a path in the parameter space. (iii)
Many types of equilibrium patterns (bifurcation or not) can be generated depending
on the choice of parameter paths. Given enough parameters, can we distinguish the
typical (i.e., generic) case that always occurs from those that occasionally or almost
never occur?
We present a general approach to address these issues and, as a result, obtain a
broader picture of the dynamic equilibrium of regional migration. We study equi-
librium diagrams along general parameter paths in a regular parameter space where
the system￿ s Jacobian matrix with respect to endogenous variables and parameters
has full rank at every equilibrium for all parameter values. It is su¢ cient to focus on
smooth (C1) paths since a continuous path can be approximated arbitrarily close by
a smooth one (see for example, Theorem 2.6 in Hirsch 1976, ch.2). We are interested
in bifurcations with crossing equilibrium loci; we call them split bifurcations. They
include the pitchfork bifurcation. When the parameter space is regular, (i) there is
5a generic (open and dense) set of parameter paths without split bifurcations in the
space of smooth paths, and (ii) in the case of two regions, the set of paths with-
out bifurcations is open (hence bifurcations are not generic). We also demonstrate
that the above mentioned model of regional migration can be embedded in a regular
parameter space.
In addition, we provide a su¢ cient condition for the commonly used two-stage
equilibrium, which deals with migration equilibrium at the ￿rst stage and suppresses
the balance of commodity markets at the second stage.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general dynamic model
of regional migration based on a static economy. Section 3 de￿nes split bifurcations
and studies its genericity in a regular parameter space. Section 4 introduces the two-
region economy with monopolistic competition and provides an example of a regular
parameterization. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Dynamics of Regional Migration
The following is a general framework of migration dynamics. Suppose the econ-
omy has n goods, m regions, and a given population of mobile agents. Let q 2
￿
q 2 <n
+j
Pn
i=1 qi = 1
￿
denote the list of prices, and s 2
n
s 2 (0;1)
m j
Pm
j=1 sj = 1
o
denote the list of population shares of mobile agents in all regions. We are interested
in the interior equilibria and exclude in de￿nition the boundary equilibria where
sj = 0 for some j. Let ￿ fi (q;s) denote the excess demand function of good i. The
equilibrium conditions for the commodity markets are
￿ ￿ fi (q;s) = 0
￿n
i=1. In addition
to material balance in commodity markets, equations f￿ gj (q;s) = 0g
m￿1
j=1 are the mi-
gration balance conditions, which require mobile agents to have equal utility levels in
all regions.3 For example, ￿ gj can be the utility di⁄erence between region j and region
m. Assume all ￿ fi and ￿ gj are C1.
This framework applies to a general class of models, which include exchange
economies and production economies with perfect or imperfect competition, as long
as the ￿rms￿pro￿t-maximizing output levels can be determined, given prices. Hence
the equilibrium in the commodity markets can be reduced to requiring the excess
3m ￿ 1 conditions su¢ ce to equalize utility levels in m regions. To see this, consider the case of
m = 1, there is no migration balance condition since no one can move. When m = 2, there is one
condition which equalizes the utility levels in both regions. For each additional region, one more
condition is imposed.
6demand functions to equal zero. The models can include economies of localization,
economies of urbanization, public goods, etc.
Note that q has only n ￿ 1 degrees of freedom and that s has m ￿ 1 degrees
of freedom. We eliminate redundant variables in the following. Let p 2 Sn￿1 =
￿
p 2 <
n￿1
++ j
Pn
i=1 pi < 1
￿
, ￿ 2 Sm￿1 =
n
￿ 2 (0;1)
m￿1 j
Pm
j=1 ￿j < 1
o
. De￿ne fi for
i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 and gi for i = 1;:::;m ￿ 1 as follows.
fi (p;￿) = ￿ fi
 
p1;:::;pn￿1;1 ￿
n￿1 P
i=1
pi;￿1;:::;￿m￿1;1 ￿
m￿1 P
j=1
￿j
!
;
gj (p;￿) = ￿ gj
 
p1;:::;pn￿1;1 ￿
n￿1 P
i=1
pi;￿1;:::;￿m￿1;1 ￿
m￿1 P
j=1
￿j
!
:
Note that ￿ fn is eliminated because of Walras￿ law. Let f = (f1;:::;fn￿1), g =
(g1;:::;gm￿1), and F = (f;g) : Sn￿1 ￿ Sm￿1 ! <n+m￿2. We call this system without
migration dynamics a static economy. A static equilibrium of this economy is a pair
(p;￿) 2 Sn￿1 ￿ Sm￿1 such that F (p;￿) = 0.
Migration dynamics are usually derived from the static equilibrium. It is common
practice in the literature to de￿ne a two-stage equilibrium (see, for example, Fujita
et al. 1999, ch. 5): At the ￿rst stage, mobile agents choose a region to reside; at the
second stage, commodity markets reach an equilibrium given the current population
distribution. That is, material balance condition f (p;￿) = 0 obtains at the second
stage, and migration balance g (p(￿);￿) = 0 obtains at the ￿rst, given that p(￿) is
a commodity equilibrium for population ￿. The adjustment to equilibrium prices in
commodity markets is assumed to take very little or no time in order to focus on the
migration dynamics. The second stage is thus suppressed; the commodity markets are
assumed to be always in equilibrium. However, this two-stage approach is valid only
if there is a unique equilibrium at the second stage for any population distribution.
Otherwise, a selection from multiple equilibria needs to be speci￿ed. The following
assumption guarantees a unique equilibrium at the second stage.
Assumption A. For any ￿ 2 Sm￿1, (i) f (p) is a vector ￿eld on Sn￿1, (ii) f
is bounded below, and (iii) if pk 2 Sn￿1 and pk ! @S (the boundary of S), then
kf (pn)k ! 1. And (iv) j￿Dpf (p;￿)j > 0 for all (p;￿) such that f (p;￿) = 0.
Condition (i) is satis￿ed since f (p) 2 <n￿1, the tangent space of Sn￿1. Since the
total endowment is bounded, condition (ii) is satis￿ed. In addition, utility nonsatia-
7tion guarantees condition (iii). All the three conditions above are satis￿ed by any
excess demand function with nonsatiation. In addition, condition (iv) requires that
the Jacobian matrix of the excess supply functions with respect to prices have full
rank at every equilibrium. By A.i, ii, iii, the Index Theorem4 applies to f (:;￿) (Mas-
Colell 1985, 5.6.1). Consequently, A.iv implies f (p;￿) = 0 has a unique solution p(￿)
for every ￿ (Kehoe 1985, 1998).
Given a population distribution, the economy reaches the equilibrium price vector
p(￿) instantaneously. Knowing the utility levels determined by the price equilibrium,
workers migrate to regions that o⁄er higher utility levels. Migration conforms to
the following dynamics: (we switch back to s temporarily for the convenience of the
notation)
_ sj = ￿ hj (s) for i = 1;:::;m,
where s 2 (0;1)
m and
Pm
j=1 _ sj =
Pm
j=1 ￿ hj (s) = 0. Since the total population is ￿xed,
we de￿ne
hj (￿) = ￿ hj
 
￿1;:::;￿m￿1;1 ￿
m￿1 P
j=1
￿j
!
for j = 1;:::;m ￿ 1:
Taking ￿ hm as redundant, the dynamical system is reduced to
_ ￿j = hj (￿) for j = 1;:::;m ￿ 1 (3)
where ￿ 2 Sm￿1. Note that h(￿) is a vector ￿eld. We call this system a dynamic
economy. A dynamic equilibrium of this economy is a list of population shares ￿ 2
Sm￿1 such that h(￿) = 0. We are particularly interested in the dynamics of C1 vector
￿elds h such that (i) their equilibria coincide with the static equilibria; i.e., h(￿) = 0
if and only if g (p(￿);￿) = 0; and (ii) their Jacobian matrices preserve the signs of
g (p(￿);￿); i.e., D￿h(￿) Q 0 if and only if D￿g (p(￿);￿) Q 0. (We need h to be C1
for the existence and uniqueness of a solution to h; see Perko 2001, 2.2.) We rule out
strange dynamics that alter the nature of the original static economy. The following
are some examples of desired dynamics.
Example 1. (i) ￿ hj is region j population share times the di⁄erence between own
utility and the average utility of all mobile agents:
￿ hj = sj
"
vj (q;s) ￿
m X
i=1
sivi (q;s)
#
;
4Note that since we deal with p 2 Sn￿1 instead of a simplex or a ball, our index is de￿ned as
sign(j￿Dpfj). The theorem says
P
p2E sign(j￿Dpfj) = 1 where E =
￿
p 2 Sn￿1jf (p;￿) = 0
￿
.
8where vj (q;s) is the utility level in region j when the population distribution is s and
the associated equilibrium price vector is q, i.e., f (q1;:::;qn;s1;:::;sm) = 0. This is
the ￿replicator dynamics￿from evolutionary games (Weibull 1995, Fujita et al. 1999).
(ii) ￿ hj is region j utility minus the average utility of all regions (Tabuchi 1986,
Zeng 2002):
￿ hj = vj (q;s) ￿
1
m
m X
i=1
vi (q;s):
We need further considerations on the boundary equilibria (where sj = 0 for some
j) to use these dynamics. According to the replicator dynamics, if a population type
dies out, it cannot replicate anymore and its population share will remain zero. This
is not appropriate in the context of regional migration since regions do not really die
out. People will move to an empty region if they have a higher potential utility there.
(Zeng 2002 speci￿es in detail the boundary equilibrium for Example 1.ii.) However,
to de￿ne a reasonable notion of boundary equilibrium, discontinuous dynamics are
needed. Hence the di⁄erentiable approach has no power on the boundary. We study
C1 dynamical systems in an open domain and focus on interior equilibria. (This does
not harm our argument, since the pitchfork bifurcation is interior.)
3 The Genericity of Bifurcations
Bifurcations occur where the dynamic behavior changes qualitatively as the vector
￿eld h changes. This is formally de￿ned below.
De￿nition 2. (Perko 2001, 4.1) Let C1 (E) denote the set of all C1 maps from E
to <n where E is an open subset of <n, and k:k1 denote the C1 norm.5 A vector
￿eld h 2 C1 (E) is structurally stable if there is an " > 0 such that for all g 2 C1 (E)
with kh ￿ gk1 < ", h and g are topologically equivalent on E (i.e., there is an E to E
homeomorphism that maps all trajectories of _ ￿ = h(￿) onto trajectories of _ ￿ = g (￿)
and preserves their orientation by time.) If h is not structurally stable, it belongs to
the bifurcation set of C1 (E).
5For f 2 C1 (E), kfk1 = supx2E kf (x)k + supx2E kDf (x)k. Without confusion, k:k denotes the
Euclidean norm and the matrix norm separately.
9In application, a vector ￿eld changes as parameters change. We embed h into
a ￿nite dimensional parameter space ￿; h : Sm￿1 ￿ ￿ ! <m￿1 where ￿ ￿ <l is
an open subset of <l. The changes in parameters result in a multidimensional path
in ￿. We focus on smooth paths. A path of parameter change in ￿ is a C1 map
￿ : [0;1] ! ￿. The space of paths is endowed with the C1 norm. Note that each
￿ (t), t 2 [0;1], on the path determines a vector ￿eld h(￿;￿ (t)). The parameter value
t is a bifurcation value if the vector ￿eld h(￿;￿ (t)) is not structurally stable. De￿ne
E (￿) = f(￿;t) 2 Sm￿1 ￿ [0;1]jh(￿;￿ (t)) = 0g as the equilibrium diagram of h along
path ￿. This is the slice of the equilibrium set taken along path ￿. Each element
(￿;t) 2 E (￿) is an equilibrium point of h for the parameter value ￿ (t) 2 ￿.
A segment on the equilibrium diagram is called an equilibrium locus. An equi-
librium diagram has a split bifurcation where there are crossing equilibrium loci.
This is de￿ned formally as follows: An equilibrium locus from an equilibrium point
(￿;t) 2 E (￿) is the image of a continuous map e : [0;1] ! E ￿ [0;1] such that
e(0) = (￿;t) and e(z) 2 E (￿) for z 2 [0;1]. Path ￿ has a split bifurcation at ^ t if
there is
￿
^ ￿;^ t
￿
2 E (￿) such that there are more than two distinct equilibrium loci
from
￿
^ ￿;^ t
￿
. It is necessarily a bifurcation since the number of equilibria changes in
the neighborhood of ^ t. A pitchfork bifurcation is indeed a split bifurcation: the three
spikes and the handle meet at a point.
A parameter space ￿ is regular for f if D(￿;￿)h(￿;￿) has full rank whenever
h(￿;￿) = 0. Our results rely on the full rank of the Jacobian matrix. We want
to study generic properties of paths. A class of paths are generic if they form an
open and dense (in the C1 norm) set in the space of smooth paths in ￿ .
Proposition 3. In a regular parameter space ￿, there is an open and dense set of
￿ without split bifurcations.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, generic paths do not have split bifurcations. How about the occurrence
of bifurcations? This relates to the notion of a regular economy. An economy ￿ is
regular if 0 is a regular value of h(:;￿). If ￿ is not a regular economy, then h(:;￿)
is not structurally stable (Rosser 1991, ch.2): In this case, one of the eigenvalues of
D￿h
￿
^ ￿;￿
￿
is 0. Since regular economies are of full Lebesgue measure in ￿ (Debreu
1970, 1976), we can perturb ￿ into a regular one so that 0 is not an eigenvalue
10anymore. This results in a qualitative change in the dynamics. The vector ￿elds of
regular economies, however, can be stable or unstable. This is because we only have
the full rank of the Jacobian matrix (with respect to endogenous variables), while
structural stability is determined by ￿ner properties such as its eigenvalues.
Fortunately, in the case of two regions, we can show that paths with bifurcations
is not generic: When there are two regions, the dynamical system is one-dimensional.
So, an equilibrium is hyperbolic6 if and only if D￿h 6= 0. Moreover, a regular economy
has a ￿nite number of equilibria (Debreu 1970). This means ￿ is not a bifurcation
value of h if and only if it is a regular economy (Perko 2001, 4.1, Theorem 3). When
m = 2, the set of paths without bifurcations is open in ￿ (Kung 2002, Proposition
6).
Therefore, paths with bifurcations are not generic, since the complement set is
open. The equilibrium diagrams of regular paths are generic. In the proof of Propo-
sition 3, we show that for a regular ￿, E (￿) is a C1 curve in a neighborhood of
any
￿
^ ￿;^ t
￿
2 E (￿). Thus, a generic equilibrium diagram contains open segments
of (nonintersecting) smooth curves (it is a one-dimensional di⁄erentiable manifold).7
When m = 2, this allows only the saddle-node bifurcations (Figures 2 and 3) or no
bifurcations (Figure 4).
4 Two-Region Migration with Monopolistic Com-
petition and Increasing Returns
In this section, we study the migration of mobile workers between two regions (￿ la
Fujita et al. 1999). We present an example of a regular parameterization for the
dynamic economy. More precisely, we construct a regular parameter space for the
static economy and show that it is regular for the dynamic economy as well (this is
not generally true for m > 2). Therefore, results in Section 2 apply to this model.
First, we introduce the model. There are two regions in the economy which are de-
noted by i 2 f1;2g. There are two types of commodities: a homogeneous agricultural
good and di⁄erentiated manufactured goods. There is a continuum of manufactured
goods of size n 2 <+, which is determined endogenously. Each manufactured good is
6An equilibrium ￿ of vector ￿eld h is hyperbolic if none of the eigenvalues of D￿h(￿;￿) has zero
real part.
7It is known that ￿all bifurcations of one-parameter families at an equilibrium with a zero eigen-
value can be perturbed to saddle-node bifurcations￿(Guckenheimer and Holmes 1997, p. 149).
11denoted by j 2 [0;n]. Let pA
i 2 <++ denote the local price of the agricultural good,
and let pi (j), where pi : [0;n] ! <++ is a measurable function, denote the local price
of each manufactured good j in region i. There are two types of consumers: immobile
farmers of population LA
i in region i 2 f1;2g, and mobile workers of population LM
who migrate between regions. Each of them is endowed with one unit of labor.
Let A 2 <+ denote the quantities of the agricultural good, and let m(j), where
m : [0;n] ! <+ is a measurable function, denote the quantity of manufactured good
j. All consumers have the same utility function
u(m;A) = M
￿A
1￿￿
where M =
￿R n
0 m(j)
￿ dj
￿ 1
￿ and 0 < ￿;￿ < 1. A consumer in region i with income Y
solves the following problem.
Max
A;m(j)2<+
u(m;A);
s:t: pA
i A +
R n
0 pi (j)m(j)dj = Y:
(4)
The demand functions are
^ Ai (Y ) = (1 ￿ ￿)Y=pA
i ;
^ mi (j;Y ) = ￿Y G
￿
1￿￿
i =pi (j)
1
1￿￿ ;
where Gi =
hR n
0 pi (j)
￿
￿￿1 dj
i ￿￿1
￿
is the manufacturing price index.
The agricultural good is produced with labor by farmers with a one-to-one input-
output ratio. The transportation of the agricultural good bears no cost. Thus,
the equilibrium agricultural price is the same in both regions by no arbitrage; let
pA
1 = pA
2 = pA. Farmers retain all the revenue; they have income pA.
Manufactured goods are produced by ￿rms that employ mobile workers. Labor is
the only input required. All ￿rms have the same inverse production function
l = F + cq
where F;c > 0 are the ￿xed and the marginal input requirements. This means l
units of labor are required for q units of output. The production technology exhibits
increasing returns to scale due to the ￿xed costs. There is free entry into the mar-
ket. Because of increasing returns to scale, each j-good is produced by and is the
only product of an operating ￿rm. Operating ￿rms choose locations and engage in
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Each ￿rm chooses a location and charges
12a uniform free on board (f.o.b.) price for its product. Firms make decisions simulta-
neously. Let wi 2 <++ denote the wage rate in region i. Suppose a ￿rm locates in
region i, charges price p, pays wage wi, and sells output q (p), where q : <++ ! < is
the demand of consumers. Its pro￿t is
￿i (p) = pq (p) ￿ wi [F + cq (p)]:
A ￿rm in region i solves the following problem.
Max
p2<++
￿i (p): (5)
Because of the assumed constant elasticity utility function and the iceberg trans-
portation cost (detailed later), the elasticity of demand facing a ￿rm is independent
of the locations of its consumers. (This is widely known; see Fujita et al. 1999.) A
monopolistically competitive ￿rm charges a price marked up from the marginal cost.
The pro￿t-maximizing price for a ￿rm in region i is pi = cwi=￿. Its maximized pro￿t
is
￿i =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
cwi
￿
q ￿
F
(1 ￿ ￿)c
￿
:
The transportation cost of manufacturing goods takes the Samuelson iceberg form. If
one unit of good is shipped across regions, 1=T unit arrives. Since ￿rms are identical
and their behavior di⁄ers only in location, we label ￿rms and their products with
their locations. This simpli￿es the notation to j 2 f1;2g. Let p
j
i denote the price of
region j products in region i, and ^ m
j
i (Y ) denote the demand for region j products of
region i consumers (to replace pi (j) and ^ mi (j;Y )). Let ni denote the number of ￿rms
in region i. The total number of operating ￿rms equals the total variety of products;
n1 + n2 = n. Note that Gi =
h
n1 (p1
i)
￿
￿￿1 + n2 (p2
i)
￿
￿￿1
i ￿￿1
￿
.
A region i ￿rm charges a f.o.b. price pi = cwi=￿. Thus, pi
i = pi and p
j
i = pjT
for j 6= i by no arbitrage. Substituting Y with wi, we have region i workers￿indirect
utility
vi = ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ wiG
￿￿
i for i 2 f1;2g:
Workers are freely mobile. They choose a region that o⁄ers a higher utility level.
An economy is an 8-tuple
￿
LA
1 ;LA
2 ;LM;￿;￿;c;F;T
￿
. Let LM
i denote the worker
population in region i, and Ai, m
j
i denote their consumptions of agricultural and
manufactured goods respectively. Let AAi, m
j
Ai denote the consumption of farmers
in regional i. Let qj denote the output level of region j ￿rms. An allocation in
13the economy is an 18-tuple
n
LM
i ;Ai;AAi;
￿
m
j
i;m
j
Ai
￿2
j=1 ;ni;qi
o2
i=1
(equal treatment
of consumers and ￿rms at the same location is implied; this is harmless since they
will behave the same in equilibrium). A feasible allocation satis￿es the following
constraints:
L
M
1 + L
M
2 = L
M: (6)
L
M
1 m
1
1 + L
A
1 m
1
A1 + L
M
2 m
1
2T + L
A
2 m
1
A2T ￿ q
1 = 0: (7)
L
M
1 m
2
1T + L
A
1 m
2
A1T + L
M
2 m
2
2 + L
A
2 m
2
A2 ￿ q
2 = 0: (8)
L
M
1 A1 + L
A
1 AA1 + L
M
2 A2 + L
A
2 AA2 = L
A: (9)
Equation (6) balances the total worker population and the total demand for work-
ers. Equations (7) and (8) balance the consumption of manufactured goods and their
production. Equation (9) balances agricultural consumption and production.
Facing prices pA, p1, p2, w1, and w2, the following conditions are satis￿ed in
equilibrium. (Note that we have already imposed no-arbitrage on the transportation
of goods.) The free entry of new ￿rms drives the pro￿t of operating ￿rms down to
zero.
￿1 = ￿2 = 0: (10)
Workers are freely mobile and identical, so their utility levels are equal if there are
workers living in both regions.
v1 = v2, if L
M
1 ;L
M
2 > 0: (11)
Note that workers￿utility vi is not de￿ned if there are no workers in region i. To
handle the boundary equilibria, we can de￿ne the potential wage as the limit of the
equilibrium wage when worker population goes to zero. Then, the potential utility
is derived accordingly. Having all workers in one region constitutes an equilibrium if
none of them wants to move out; that is, the potential utility in the other region is not
higher. As mentioned in Section 2, we focus on interior equilibria only: LM
1 ;LM
2 > 0.
An equilibrium is a list of prices and a feasible allocation such that conditions (4),
(5), (10), and (11) are satis￿ed. We simplify the system in the Appendix and reach
the following de￿nition.
14De￿nition 4. An equilibrium is a list (￿;w1;w2) 2 (0;1) ￿ S2 that satis￿es the
following equations. (Note that ￿ = LM
1 =LM, pA = 1 ￿ w1 ￿ w2, and ￿ q =
F￿
c(1￿￿):)
￿LM￿w1G
￿
1￿￿
1
￿
cw1
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
1 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
1
￿
cw1
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)LM￿w2G
￿
1￿￿
2 T
￿
cw1
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
2 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
2 T
￿
cw1
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ ￿ q = 0; (12)
￿LM￿w1G
￿
1￿￿
1 T
￿
cw2
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
1 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
1 T
￿
cw2
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)LM￿w2G
￿
1￿￿
2
￿
cw2
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
2 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
2
￿
cw2
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ ￿ q = 0: (13)
w1 ￿ w2G
￿￿
2 G
￿
1 = 0: (14)
To apply the two-stage approach, we need to verify assumption A. Conditions A.i
to A.iii are straightforward. Condition A.iv guarantees a unique commodity equilib-
rium (so that the two-stage approach is sound) and is necessary for the vector ￿eld
to be C1 when the dynamics in Example 1 are used. Since this paper studies the
genericity of bifurcations rather than the existence of equilibria, we do not repeat the
task but rather assume that previous work has found the parameter range where A.iv
is satis￿ed.
It is di¢ cult to check whether the parameters introduced so far constitute a regular
parameter space. We augment the system with more parameters and show that the
new parameter space is regular. Let ￿ be an open subset of <3
++, its elements are
denoted by ￿ = (v;￿), where v 2 <2
++ and ￿ 2 <++. These parameters enter the
model in the following way. (i) v parameterizes ￿regional ￿xed input￿ : The ￿xed
labor input of ￿rms in region i is F + vi. Note that ￿rms￿chosen prices (cwi=￿) are
not a⁄ected by vi, but the zero-pro￿t output level for region i ￿rms is now
￿(F+vi)
c(1￿￿) .
(ii) ￿ parameterizes ￿regional amenity￿ : Workers have preferences over regions in the
following way. If a worker lives in region 2, her utility function is unchanged. If she
lives in region 1, her utility is factored up by 1=￿. The new utility function of region
1 workers is
1
￿
u
￿
m
1
1;m
2
1;A1
￿
:
Lemma 5. ￿ is a regular parameter space for vector ￿elds h(￿;￿) de￿ned on page
8.
15Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the augmented parameter space, with the new and original parameters
combined, is also regular. The key to this construction is that these new parameters
break the symmetric parameterization of the original model. Take the amenity factor
￿ for example. Consider a two-parameter system with T and ￿ (set LA
1 = LA
2 , v = 0).
If ￿ = 1, which means the workers do not particularly prefer one region to the other,
then the equilibrium diagram along the transportation cost will have a pitchfork
bifurcation. If we set ￿ > 1 or < 1, the resulting equilibrium diagram (still, along
T) will look like Figures 2 or 3. Therefore, the pitchfork bifurcation is the result
of a symmetric parameterization along transportation cost. It is not robust against
arbitrary perturbations in parameters.
5 Conclusion
It is important to study an economic system in a low dimensional parameter space,
especially when the chosen parameters are the main forces changing the economy. The
study of a speci￿c type of bifurcation may provide strong insight into the dynamics
of regional migrations. However, the real world has countless parameters that are
neglected in a model. Since the choice of parameters a⁄ects the dynamic behavior of
a system, this raises the following question: ￿what kind of behavior is typical given
enough parameters?￿It is inevitable to work on models with only a few parameters,
but, at the same time, it is not desirable to study properties that are rare occurrences
in the real world. We show that, in a regular parameter space, there is a generic set
of smooth parameter paths without split bifurcations, and in the case of two regions,
smooth paths with bifurcations are not generic. In particular, we study the migration
of workers in a two-region economy where ￿rms that produce with increasing returns
to scale technologies compete monopolistically as in Fujita et al. (1999). We resent
an example of a regular parameter space for this model.
Regional divergence can occur when the symmetric equilibrium becomes unsta-
ble. However, the popular pitchfork bifurcation, as a split bifurcation, is not a robust
representation of the dynamics involved . Thus, a broader picture is needed to un-
derstand the full extent of the dynamic behavior of this model. In the case of two
regions, the generic case contains the saddle-node bifurcations or no bifurcations .
16Appendix
Simplify the system (Section 4)
First, by (4), the demand of workers for the agricultural good and manufac-
tured goods are Ai = (1 ￿ ￿)wi=pA and m
j
i = ￿wiG
￿
1￿￿
i
￿
p
j
i
￿ ￿1
1￿￿ respectively, and
the demand of farmers for the two types of goods are AAi = (1 ￿ ￿) and m
j
Ai =
￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
i =
￿
p
j
i
￿ 1
1￿￿. By (5), pi = cwi=￿. Then by (10),
q
1 = q
2 =
F￿
c(1 ￿ ￿)
= ￿ q;
ni =
LM
i
F + c
F￿
c(1￿￿)
=
LM
i (1 ￿ ￿)
F
:
Let ￿ = LM
1 =LM; by (6) and the fact that we study interior equilibria only, 0 < ￿ < 1.
Equations (7), (8) and (9) are dependent because of Walras￿law; we take the last one
as redundant. Plug the above results into (7) and (8), and we have
￿LM￿w1G
￿
1￿￿
1
￿
cw1
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
1 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
1
￿
cw1
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)LM￿w2G
￿
1￿￿
2 T
￿
cw1
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
2 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
2 T
￿
cw1
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ ￿ q = 0;
￿LM￿w1G
￿
1￿￿
1 T
￿
cw2
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
1 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
1 T
￿
cw2
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)LM￿w2G
￿
1￿￿
2
￿
cw2
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
2 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
2
￿
cw2
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿ ￿ q = 0:
Equation (11) can be replaced with
w1 ￿ w2G
￿￿
2 G
￿
1 = 0:
Finally, normalizing prices to w1 + w2 + pA = 1 and letting pA = 1 ￿ w1 ￿ w2, the
remaining is a system of three variables and three equations.
Proof of Proposition 3.8 A path ￿ is called regular if D(￿;t)h(￿;￿ (t)) has full
rank (which is m ￿ 1) whenever h(￿;￿ (t)) = 0 for t 2 [0;1]. First, we show that a
regular path does not have split bifurcations.
Suppose D(￿;t)h
￿
^ ￿;￿
￿
^ t
￿￿
has full rank, which is (m ￿ 1) ￿ m, then it has m ￿ 1
independent columns. Without loss of generality, suppose D(￿￿1;t)h
￿
^ ￿;￿
￿
^ t
￿￿
has full
8The proof is adopted from Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 in Kung (2002), which deals with one-
dimensional parameterizations of vector ￿elds.
17rank (where ￿￿1 denotes (￿2;:::;￿m￿1)). By the implicit function theorem, h
￿
^ ￿;￿
￿
^ t
￿￿
=
0 can be locally solved by a C1 function of ￿1. This means E (￿) is a C1 curve in a
neighborhood of
￿
^ ￿;^ t
￿
. So, there can be only two equilibrium loci from
￿
^ ￿;^ t
￿
.
Next, we show the set of regular paths is open and dense. Since a perturbation
(in the C1 norm) yields small changes in h(￿;￿ (t)) and its ￿rst order derivatives,
openness is straightforward by the continuity of h(￿;￿ (t)) and D(￿;t)h(￿;￿ (t)). To
show density, we need the following theorem (see Guillemin and Pollack 1974, p. 68,
and Mas-Colell 1985, p. 320). For a Cr map f : M ! N between manifolds, y 2 N
is a regular value if Df (x) has full rank whenever f (x) = y.
Transversality Theorem. Suppose that f : X ￿S ! <m is a Cr map where X;S
are Cr boundariless manifolds with r > maxf0;dim(X) ￿ mg; let fs (x) = f (x;s),
fs : X ! <m. If c 2 <m is a regular value for f, then except for s in a set of measure
zero in S, c is a regular value for fs.
Augment the parameter space with A = ￿ whose elements are a 2 A. For a path
￿, we construct a map ’ : Sm￿1 ￿ [0;1] ￿ A ! <m￿1,
’(￿;t;a) = h(￿;￿ (t) + a):
Apparently, D(￿;a)’ = D(￿;￿)h(￿;￿) whenever ￿ = ￿ (t)+a for any t for all a close to 0.
And D(￿;￿)h(￿;￿) has full rank whenever h(￿;￿) = h(￿;￿ (t) + a) = 0 because ￿ is
regular. This means D(￿;a)’, and also D(￿;t;a)’, has full rank whenever ’(￿;t;a) = 0.
By the Transversality Theorem, for almost all a, D(￿;t)’(￿;t;a) has full rank whenever
’(￿;t;a) = 0. So, we can ￿nd ￿ a arbitrarily close to 0 such that D(￿;t)’(￿;t;￿ a) has
full rank whenever ’(￿;t;￿ a) = 0. Then ￿0, where ￿0 (t) = ￿ (t) + ￿ a, is a regular path
arbitrarily close to ￿.
Proof of Lemma 5. Parameter v changes conditions (12) and (13) to
￿LM￿w1G
￿
1￿￿
1
￿
cw1
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
1 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
1
￿
cw1
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)LM￿w2G
￿
1￿￿
2 T
￿
cw1
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
2 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
2 T
￿
cw1
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
￿(F + v1)
c(1 ￿ ￿)
= 0;
(15)
￿LM￿w1G
￿
1￿￿
1 T
￿
cw2
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
1 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
1 T
￿
cw2
￿ T
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)LM￿w2G
￿
1￿￿
2
￿
cw2
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
+
LA
2 ￿pAG
￿
1￿￿
2
￿
cw2
￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
￿(F + v2)
c(1 ￿ ￿)
= 0:
(16)
18Note that ￿ does not a⁄ect consumers￿demand; it plays a role in their location
choices only. Condition (14) is changed to
w1
￿
￿ w2G
￿￿
2 G
￿
1 = 0: (17)
This is because equilibrium wage rates are adjusted according to the amenity factor.
Next, we show that ￿ is regular for the static economy. Let f1, f2, g denote the
left-hand side functions of (15), (16), and (17), respectively. De￿ne F = (f1;f2;g),
F : <3
++ ! <. We have
D￿F (p;￿;￿) =
0
B
@
￿
￿
c(1￿￿) 0 0
0 ￿
￿
c(1￿￿) 0
0 0 w1
1
C
A
So, D(p;￿;￿)F =
￿
D(p;￿)F;D￿F
￿
always has full rank at every equilibrium for all ￿ 2 ￿.
The conditions imposed on h (page 8) ensure that ￿ is a regular parameter space
for h(￿;￿) if and only if it is regular for g (p(￿);￿;￿). The next lemma shows that
the Jacobian matrix of g (p(￿);￿) at ￿ has full rank (which is 1), if and only if that
of F (p￿;￿) at (p￿;￿), p￿ = p(￿) does. So, ￿ is regular for g (p(￿);￿;￿). Note that
j￿Dpf (p;￿;￿)j > 0 (i.e., A.iv) for all ￿ in a neighborhood of (0;0;1) by continuity.
We further restrict ￿ to the range where A.iv is satis￿ed. Note that D￿F (p;￿;￿) has
full rank regardless of the values of the original parameters in the relevant range.
Lemma 6. When m = 2, for any ￿, for all (p￿;￿) such that F (p￿;￿) = 0 (i.e.,
p￿ = p(￿))
￿ ￿D(p;￿)F (p￿;￿)
￿ ￿ = 0 if and only if d
d￿g (p(￿);￿) = 0.
Proof. Since p(￿) is derived from f (p;￿) = 0 and jDpf (p(￿);￿)j 6= 0 (by assump-
tion A.iv), by the implicit function theorem,
D￿p(￿) = ￿[Dpf (p(￿);￿)]
￿1 D￿f (p(￿);￿):
And
d
d￿
g (p(￿);￿) = Dpg (p(￿);￿)D￿p(￿) + D￿g (p(￿);￿);
= ￿Dpg (p(￿);￿)[Dpf (p(￿);￿)]
￿1 D￿f (p(￿);￿) + D￿g (p(￿);￿):
19Next, we expand
￿ ￿D(p;￿)F
￿ ￿ along its nth row.
￿ ￿D(p;￿)F
￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Dpf D￿f
Dpg D￿g
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
= D￿g jDpfj +
Pn￿1
k=1 (￿1)
n+k Dpkg jMkj:
where Mk is the matrix obtained from Dpf by eliminating its kth column and adding
D￿f as the last column.
Let x be the vector that solves
(Dpf)x = D￿f:
Then x = [Dpf]
￿1 D￿f, and by Cramer￿ s rule, xk = jDpfj
￿1 jNkj where Nk is the
matrix obtained from Dpf by replacing its kth column with D￿f. Notice that Mk
and Nk di⁄er only in the positions of their columns. Nk can be obtained from Mk by
switching the last column, D￿f, with the preceding column n ￿ k ￿ 1 times. Thus,
jNkj = (￿1)
n￿k￿1 jMkj. So,
￿ ￿D(p;￿)F
￿ ￿ = D￿g jDpfj +
Pn
k=1 (￿1)
2n￿1 Dpkg jNkj
= D￿g jDpfj ￿
Pn
k=1 Dpkg jDpfjxk
= D￿g jDpfj ￿ jDpfjDpgx
= jDpfj
￿
D￿g ￿ Dpg [Dpf]
￿1 D￿f
￿
= jDpfj
d
d￿
g (p(￿);￿):
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